The literature on economic analysis of privatisation is dominated by efficient and equity aspects of manufacturing and infrastructure privatisation.
ber of universities is limited to those with an affiliated college system. 6 The data reveal the following three essential features that justify the focus of analysis on general collegiate education in this article.
First, the number of institutions in general education is the highest among the types and levels of higher education in the state. For instance, 60% of total universities, 9.52% of total colleges, 75.71% of government colleges, 93.39% of private aided colleges, 61.14% of private unaided colleges, and 40.54% of university colleges are in general education.
Second, of the total colleges in general higher education (1, 122) , the share of the general degree colleges (924) is highest (82.35%). By management of colleges, 94.97% of government colleges, 89.85% of private aided colleges, 75.92% of private unaided colleges, and 53.33% of university colleges belong to general degree colleges. 7 Third, the role of the private sector is prominent but presents a contrast between agricultural and nonagricultural education. For instance, there is no private sector participation in agricultural education. Within nonagricultural education, the pure private sector (i.e., comprising private unaided colleges) is dominant in all types of higher education, as it comprises 55.53% of colleges in general education (in particular, 51.19% of total general degree colleges, 76.08% of colleges in technical education, 95.45% of colleges in medical education [allopathic] , and 80.95% of colleges under the Indian system of medicine [nonallopathic] ). The mixed private sector (i.e., comprising private aided colleges) shows varying share in all types of higher education, that is, 28.97% of colleges in general education (in particular, 31.6% of total general degree colleges), 7.05% of colleges in technical education, and 11.90% of colleges in Indian system of medicine (nonallopathic). In short, pure private sector comprises 63.14% of colleges, and mixed private sector comprises 21.56% of colleges. Or, the contribution of pure and mixed private sector to Karnataka's higher education accounts for 84.70% of colleges.
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PRIVATISATION POLICIES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
Privatisation policies have three important dimensions: First, transferring current ownership and management of colleges from the government sector to pure private sector and/or mixed private sector; second, shifting from current public financing of government and private colleges to private financing including private foreign financing, as India is an open economy, or to a mix of publicprivate financing of government colleges; third, establishing new colleges and/or continuing the established colleges under pure or mixed private ownership, management, and financing. Thus, the growth of private aided and unaided colleges should be treated as a process of privatisation of higher education.
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Over the years, there have been no proposals to (a) hand over the ownership and management of government colleges to the private aided or unaided sector, and (b) take over private aided or unaided colleges as government colleges in the state. On the other hand, all new colleges established since July 1987 have been permitted only on a permanent unaided basis. Furthermore, there have been many policy measures and proposals to reduce financial support and assistance to private aided colleges. This implies that changes in public financing issues are relevant for privatisation of collegiate education in the state. 10 Thus, in what follows, the policy measures and proposals for changes in public financing to private colleges in Karnataka State are focused on.
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The nature of state government or public financing to collegiate education is different between the government colleges and private colleges. 12 In the case of government colleges, all expenditure (i.e., net of students' fees to the state government, however) are met by the state government. In the case of private colleges, the state government provides maintenance or teaching grants in the form of a percentage reimbursement of salary payments of working teaching and nonteaching staff. These grants are called grants in aid (GIA). A college that receives (or does not receive) the GIA is called an aided (or unaided) college.
13
The framework for formulation and implementation of GIA policy is provided in GIA codes. The codes specify, among other things, that the GIA is a discretionary grant, as the state government has all rights reserved to it with regard to changing and interpreting the rules and, hence, for extending or withdrawing the grant. Thus, the GIA cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Furthermore, an important precondition for the GIA is the availability of funds under the concerned heads of expenditure in the state budget. 14 The GIA policy has both promotional and regulatory objectives, such as (a) encouraging private enterprise and management in higher education through private-public partnership in financing; (b) regulation of the administration of aided colleges (e.g., staff recruitment, reservation policy and roaster system in recruitment, admission of students, and fixing of student fees); (c) reduction of total cost of providing education for the state government, especially as compared to a hypothetical situation where all the private aided colleges were to be established and totally funded as government colleges; (d) equalisation of salary and service conditions for teaching and nonteaching staff in aided colleges on par with the staff in government colleges, thereby enabling private college management to attract the best qualified and experienced staff for improving the quality of teaching in the colleges; and (e) reduction in the cost of accessing col-legiate education by students, as compared to a situation in which the GIA is absent and the private aided colleges work on the basis of full-cost recovery from students. Table 2 presents the relative share of general higher education (i.e., university and higher education [U&HE] ) and on GIA to collegiate education within the state's budget in [2002] [2003] . First, share of revenue (or current) expenditure on U&HE constitutes only about 2.4% of the total revenue expenditure of the state. Second, share of capital expenditure (or investment) on U&HE constitutes only about 0.1% of the total capital expenditure of the state. Third, share of revenue expenditure on U&HE is about 13% of the total revenue expenditure on general education. Fourth, revenue expenditure constitutes about 99% of the total expenditure on U&HE. Fifth, share of GIA to collegiate education constitutes about 50% of total revenue expenditure on U&HE. Sixth, GIA to collegiate education as a percentage of total revenue deficit of the state government is about 7%. And seventh, share of expenditure on U&HE in the net state domestic product (at factor cost and current prices) is only about 0.5%.
Select indicators of level of GIA to collegiate education are presented in Table 3 . It is apparent that of all the types of private aided colleges, the general degree colleges constitute the largest number, composing about 90% of total number of colleges, 96% of total enrolment of students, 97% of total budgetary allocation, and rupees (Rs) 8.1 (or US$0.17) million of GIA per college. However, in terms of GIA per student, general degree colleges stand next to the colleges of education.
From the viewpoint of the state government, the justifications for reduction in GIA to collegiate education include (a) lack of budgetary resources to meet the existing needs of GIA, (b) switching budgetary expenditure from higher education to meet the increasing needs of resources for establishment and expansion of school education in backward areas, (c) presumption that the aided colleges are financially strong enough to mobilise their own resources, and (d) reduction of budgetary subsidies to higher education and to achieve the fiscal objectives (e.g., targeted reduction in revenue deficit) of the medium-term fiscal plan.
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Thus, over the years, the GIA to collegiate education has been reduced by the following measures. First, all the private degree colleges established after June 1, 1987 have been started on permanently non-GIA basis. Second, since 1990-1991, no new courses have been brought under GIA, and since 1993-1994, there has been a ban on filling vacant positions of nonteaching staff. Third, a large number of teaching posts has remained vacant for several years and is being gradually converted into unaided posts. The resultant savings are reallocated to meet the increasing cost of GIA, especially due to implementation of revised pay scales in effect from January 1, 1996. Fourth, closure of traditional courses in aided colleges where the enrolment of total students in a course was fewer than 40 students and/or where the workload for the teaching staff was not full. The staff of such closed courses had been transferred or deployed to other aided colleges where the workload existed, or to newly established government colleges.
In addition, further reduction in GIA is anticipated under the following new proposals of the state government. 16 First, no new colleges are to be brought under the GIA codes. Second, GIA is to be phased out step by step for currently aided institutions over the next 5 years by stopping GIA for 10-year-old colleges in urban areas and for 15-year-old colleges in rural areas. This is called exit policy. Third, the savings of resources through exit policy are to be redeployed to bring new schools on GIA.
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRIVATISATION POLICIES
Select implications of proposed privatisation policies (i.e., exit policy) for higher education on growth of pure private sector, price of education services, budget deficit, access and affordability, and quality of higher education are analysed below. 
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Growth of the Pure Private Sector
A quick glance at the location pattern and duration of GIA by type of colleges in Table 4 shows the following implications of the exit policy. (a) Of the 292 general degree colleges, 253 colleges (87%) are located in urban areas. In the same way, all the aided colleges in education, law, and fine arts are located in urban areas. Thus, the exit policy for rural colleges is applicable only for general degree colleges. (b) If the proposed exit policy is implemented, 78% of urban general degree colleges, 64% of rural general degree colleges, 75% of law degree colleges, 68% of colleges of education, and 100% of fine arts colleges will be out of GIA immediately, as they have been receiving grants for 10 years in urban areas and 15 years in rural areas. (c) At the end of the next 5 years from 2003, another 31 colleges in urban areas and 13 colleges in rural areas will be out of the GIA policy. Thus, the cumulative total number of colleges to be out of GIA in 2008 will be 98.63% of general degree colleges, 100% of law degree colleges, and 96% of the colleges of education. Or, 98.46% of 325 private aided colleges will be out of GIA policy by 2008 and, hence, contribute to higher growth of pure private sector.
Fiscal Effect
In terms of current levels of GIA as given in Table 3 , the total resource saving to the state government from the exit policy is equal to Rs 2,093.05 (or US$43.36) million, or 85.88% of total GIA to collegiate education in [2002] [2003] . This saving constitutes about 6.12% of the revenue deficit (revised estimate) of the state government.
Price Effect
An increase in fee is inevitable to recover, among others, the expenditure on staff salary due to withdrawal of GIA under the exit policy. The fee escalation will have to be equivalent, on an average, to the per capita grant to the colleges, as shown in Table 3 . Supposing that all students pay the total fee, the total fee collections would have constituted 4.84% of GIA in 2002-2003. Thus, for total cost recovery on account of withdrawal of GIA to general degree colleges, the total fee per student should have been increased by a minimum of 21 times more than the total fee charged in 2002-2003. 18 
Effects on Access and Affordability
A steep rise in student fee raises many issues relating to access to and affordability of higher education, especially for poor but merited students in all castes and communities. Although (a) education loans from commercial banks, and (b) scholarships, free studentship, and other forms of transfer payments from the government and colleges are often argued as mechanisms to offset increased cost due to fee hike, the extent of availability and accessibility of these resources for all students and the feasibility of families taking such loans are not ascertained. 19 Aided colleges have been the major source of accessing higher education in basic sciences, humanities, and social sciences. In the recent past, there has been a decline in enrolment in collegiate education, especially in basic science education, in the state. The decline is explained by many factors, such as poor quality and relevance of degree education and overemphasis on professional education, especially information technology and management courses. Hence, any steep increase in student fee may have a negative impact in terms of a raise in current dropout or decline in future enrolment of students due to nonaffordability.
Effects on Quality
An impact of reduction in GIA on the quality of collegiate education may be felt in more than a few ways. First, if the nonfunded GIA posts are not to be filled by private management, other things being equal, it would result in a higher student-teacher ratio and reduced quantity and quality of teacher time per student. Second, over time, nonfunded GIA courses may be closed, especially if the prevailing pattern of declining enrolment is continued. Third, if a college has only aided courses, gradual elimination of GIA posts shall eventually lead to closure of the colleges. Fourth, if the college management makes alternative appointments against the nonfunded GIA posts, the appointment may not carry salary and perks that are equivalent to persons on GIA posts. Hence, the best of talent may not be attracted to the teaching profession, and heavy turnover of teaching staff may be inevitable.
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Nondiscriminatory Effects
Although the proposed GIA policy is discriminatory in regard to location of colleges and duration of GIA to the colleges, it does not differentiate (a) between subjects in a course or courses in a college, (b) between colleges located in backward and forward areas, (c) between colleges in terms of the composition of students who are female, scheduled castes and tribes, and other backward communities, (d) between colleges in terms of having professional and vocational courses and traditional (i.e., non-market oriented, culture promoting and pro-tecting) courses. Furthermore, for lack of information on finances of the private aided colleges, the proposed GIA policy does not discriminate between financially strong and weak colleges. Consequently, the proposed privatisation policies will have indiscriminate effects on both efficiency and equity in collegiate education in the state.
NEED FOR POSTPRIVATISATION CONTROL DEVICES
It is gratifying to note that there are several built-in postprivitisatoion control devices in the proposed privatisation policies. For instance, colleges to be brought under exit policy (a) shall not reduce the salary and allowances of existing staff and fee exemptions and concessions for socially vulnerable and backward communities (e.g., students belonging to scheduled castes and tribes), (b) shall have opportunities to levy higher fees, and (c) shall be subject to recruitment of teaching and nonteaching staff as per the qualifications prescribed by the government. Nevertheless, there is a need for greater and wider postprivatisation control devices to safeguard quality, access, affordability, and equity, and regulate cost and price in higher education. These devices are suggested below.
Devices to Safeguard Quality and Improve Relevance
Three important institutional mechanisms for monitoring and regulation of the quality of collegiate education may be mentioned. 21 First, grant and withdrawal of affiliation to colleges by state universities as per the State Universities Act 2000 (Government of Karnataka, 2001b) . Second, assessment and accreditation by the National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC). Third, International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9000 for educational institutions is considered. If NAAC's accreditation is made compulsory for all colleges, it shall go a long way in professional improvement of quality of higher education, along with mandatory affiliation requirements.
An important determinant of relevance of collegiate education is the prescription of curricula for courses. At present, the universities fix the curriculum for their colleges. Thus, colleges lack autonomy in designing their own curricula according to the particular needs of students and areas within the universities. To bring in innovations, dynamism, and improve relevance, colleges should seek, and universities must offer, academic autonomy. Furthermore, autonomy is costly. Hence, academic autonomy should go along with financial autonomy for fixing college-specific student fee and other sources of resource mobilisation.
Regulation of Cost and Price
All colleges (i.e., autonomous and nonautonomous colleges) in pure and mixed private sector should ensure transparency in all receipts. The receipts include differential fee income for professional and nonprofessional courses, endowments, charity, philanthropy, and alumni associations (i.e., donations after graduation) and consultancy. Furthermore, accountability for all expenditure for development of the colleges and improvements in delivery of their educational services should be ensured.
The future planning for higher education should aim at making all-out efforts by all stakeholders (i.e., the state government, affiliating university, and college management) for interinstitutional collaboration (e.g., between colleges and university located within the same area) to avoid creating parallel facilities and, thereby, promoting network of personnel and institutions for long-run reduction in the total social cost of providing collegiate education in an area. Thus, consolidation and cooperative sharing of facilities should guide the future quantitative expansion of private higher education.
There is a need for a selective GIA policy in order to minimise the transitional and terminal costs of privatisation of higher education. Some elements of such a policy restructuring may include the following. First, prioritisation and targeting of reduction in budgetary subsidy is essential. For instance, GIA should not be cut for courses that have little or no market or employment orientation or that aim at preserving and fostering the culture, encouraging learning, and teaching and researching in subjects of culture and civilisation of the society. This point is also endorsed in Government of India (2000) . Second, area-specific instruments for reduction in subsidies must be evolved. For instance, GIA should not be cut to colleges that are located in backward and rural areas and in which large numbers of students come from poor families, especially women, and scheduled castes and tribes students.
The Supreme Court judgment on October 31, 2002, in the T. M. A. Pai Foundation and others versus State of Karnataka and others case (Writ Petition [Civil] 317 of 1993) has three major implications for the regulatory powers of the state government on admission and fee fixation policy for private institutions in higher professional education. First, the State government or the university may not be entitled to interfere with the right to admit students, so long as the admission to the unaided educational institutions is on a transparent basis and the merit is adequately taken of.
Second, "fees to be charged by unaided institutions cannot be regulated but no institution should charge capitation fee." Third, "appropriate machinery can be devised by the state or university to ensure that no capitation fee is charged and there is no profiteering, though a reasonable surplus for the furtherance of education is permissible." In essence, the judgment calls for deregulation of both admissions and fees in unaided professional colleges.
Subsequently, the bench of five judges of the Supreme Court is constituted to clarify doubts and/or anomalies (Writ Petition [Civil] No. 350 of 1993) This bench gave the judgment on August 14, 2003, which included the following important provisions. First, each institution must have the freedom to fix its own fee structure, taking into consideration the need to generate funds to run the institution and to provide facilities necessary for the benefit of the students. Second, the respective state government-concerned authority shall set up, in each state, a multimember committee headed by a retired high court judge who shall be nominated by the chief justice of India. Each institution must get approval of this committee on the fee to be charged. Third, the respective state governments do appoint a permanent committee to ensure fairness and transparency in the conduct of entrance tests for admission of students to their professional courses.
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The above public decontrol on admissions and fee fixation is applicable to professional higher education in India. In the same way, there is a need for a legal framework to ensure transparency in admission of students and fixation of college special fees in nonprofessional education. Such a legal framework is the most important postprivatisation control device for regulation of cost and price and for implementing affordable prices.
Need for Community Participation
There is a need for greater and active involvement of local people, industry, and old students in developing and auditing the performance of the private colleges. In fact, these are the potential community sources for mobilising financial resources for future development of the colleges through endowments, philanthropy, and alumni associations (i.e., donations after graduation). To tap these sources of resources, effective mechanisms for participation of and coordination with industry, old students, and local people must be developed by the colleges. Such of those colleges that excel in these sources of resource mobilisation should be provided with financial incentives (e.g., a certain percentage of matching grants) by the union or state government. In addition, the role of charity of religious institutions (e.g., temples under the Endowment Act) should be recognised. If permissible, the limits to charity under the Endowment Act should be increased, subject to the condition that increased charity must be spent only on improving educational institutions.
Need for a Competition Policy
India is a founding member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since January 1995. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a framework for transparent, nondiscriminatory, and rule-based international trading of services, includes education services. Under the WTO (1998) classification of services, education services include primary, secondary, higher, adult, and other education services. GATS defines services trade as occurring through four possible modes of supply: Mode 1 (cross-border supply, e.g., virtual university and online degree programme), Mode 2 (consumption abroad, e.g., Indian students studying abroad), Mode 3 (commercial presence, e.g., local branch campuses and twinning arrangements), and Mode 4 (movement of natural persons, e.g., temporary movement of teaching staff to foreign countries). A new round of services negotiations including education services was launched in January 2000. Consequently, proposals from the United States on higher education services have already been submitted to India. At present, India's schedule of specific commitments (i.e., sectoral or horizontal schedules of commitments) under the GATS does not include any of the education services (Government of India, 2004). However, if commitments are given in future, they would imply a need for a competition policy for higher education in India, as a postglobalisation control device, to enhance and strengthen their global competitiveness due to (a) the opportunities for enhancing export of education services from India to the United States and (b) challenges of import competition from the United States to producers and providers of education services in India. OECD's (2003) postprivatisation control devices refer to provisions and arrangements that governments have put in place at the time of sale in order to retain some degree of control over the privatized state-owned enterprises, and to protect the newly privatised companies from the rigours of the competition for corporate control. (p. 106) The instruments of these devices are summarized in Table 5 .
Relevance of OECD Instruments of Postprivatisation Control Devices
The golden shares and stable code of shareholders' instruments are relevant and applicable for India's higher education to protect domestic private colleges from hostile takeovers and to preserve the domestic ownership structure of the private colleges, in an era of global privatisation of higher education. In the same way, OECD's approach of retaining a controlling interest is of relevance and Table 5 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Instruments of Postprivatisation Control Devices
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Three major instruments of postprivatisation control are golden shares, stable core of shareholders, and retention of controlling stake as opposed to full privatisation. To quote the OECD (2003):
Golden Shares provide governments with special powers and veto rights in the fully or partially privatized companies, and have served governments as a means of protecting the newly privatized company from hostile takeovers on national security or on public policy grounds, where this has been deemed to be necessary.
However, the instrument can act as an impediment to improved efficiency, in that they can potentially serve as a vehicle for government intervention in company decisions, and undermine effective functioning of the market for corporate control. For this reason their adoption can potentially create investor uncertainty, and generally is not favoured by the markets. (p.
107)
Under the stable core of shareholders approach, the ownership structure of the privatised company includes a stable core of shareholders made up of a group of national investors (such as banks,allied industrial groups,families) with whom a significant stake in the privatized company is placed.These investors are then required to retain their shareholding for a specific period of time,and they act jointly in exercising control over the company. The intent is to create a stable core of shareholders in order to provide the company with stable governance during the early years after its privatisation and thus protect it from hostile takeover bids. . . . The use of a stable core of shareholders may give rise to corporate governance problems. . . . More specifically: (i) They can tie up the core shareholders' assets in crossshareholdings and as a result capital may not be employed in the most productive manner.
(ii) Management power is entrenched and the approach tends to protect the interests of the core shareholders at the expense of improved corporate efficiency and, hence interests of other investors. (iii) Is not transparent and tends to inhibit the emergence and functioning of the market for corporate control. (pp. 111-113) An attempt to "privitise a minority stake in the company, while remaining committed to retaining public ownership and control over the long-term as a means of protecting national or public interest," is called retaining a controlling interest approach. In this partial privitisation approach,"the intent is to sell a minority stake in the company to improve its performance through the infusion of private equity and management,but there are no immediate plans to relinquish control." The main drawbacks of the approach are as follows. First, "if the structure of governance and incentives are left unchanged, the full benefits of improved efficiency are not likely to be realised." Second, the approach "does not sever the link to the government and as a result the government tends to remain exposed to risk,especially where the activity embodies public interest considerations" (pp. 114-115).
applicability for the entire discussion on the postprivatisation control devices for collegiate education in Karnataka State. Thus, OECD experiences are of relevance for designing implementable postprivatisation control devices in India's higher education.
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This article has analysed the privatisation policies and postprivatisation control devices for higher education in India. Based on a regional study of collegiate education under general higher education, policy measures in the 1990s and current proposals for privatisation are analysed and their quantitative effects are estimated. Postprivatisation control devices are proposed, with special reference to relevance and applicability of the OECD instruments. The major conclusions and policy implications are as follows.
• The contribution of pure private sector and mixed private sector is dominant in all types of higher education, except in agricultural education.
• Privatisation of higher education is identified in terms of management, ownership, and financing aspects. However, only the financing aspect (i.e., new colleges to be established, or existing colleges to be continued, under the exclusive private ownership, management, and financing) is relevant for analysis of privatisation policies for higher education.
• The reduction in budgetary support in the 1990s and current proposals to gradually phase out public financing to private sector education have enhanced the process of education privatisation. The effects are estimated in terms of fiscal effect, price effect, effects on access and affordability, effect on quality, and nondiscriminatory effects. Except for positive fiscal effects, the effects of privatisation are found to be mixed or negative. Thus, postprivatisation control devices are relevant to safeguard quality, access, affordability, and equity in higher education.
• OCED's instruments of postprivatisation control devices in the form of golden shares, stable code of shareholders, and retaining a controlling interest are found to be relevant and applicable to protect domestic private sector education from hostile takeovers and to preserve the domestic ownership structure in an era of global privatisation of higher education.
Specific postprivatisation control devices, proposed for India's higher education policy, are as follows:
• Mandatory accreditation of all private colleges for improving quality of their provisioning of services.
• Area-based planning for interinstitutional networking and utilisation of resources for reduction in cost of provisioning of services by public and private sector education institutions.
• Privatisation policies should not be applied to courses that are culture promoting and protecting and that have no market orientation in higher education.
• Autonomy for private colleges should be granted to improve relevance of education with built-in safeguards and transparency in regard to fixation of student fees, staff service conditions, and admission of students.
• Transparency of all receipts and accountability of all expenditure should be ensured in all private sector institutions.
• A competition policy should be evolved to prepare the private sector colleges in the face of global competition under WTO regime.
• OECD instruments for postprivatisation control devices should be given a try in the design and implementation of postprivatisation control devices.
• Best practices of postprivatisation control devices of other countries should be explored for design and implementation of alternative policy devices.
This article is based on the Indian experiences. However, the framework, results, and implications of this article are applicable for other developing countries with a comparable structure of higher education. Such applications shall provide alternative evidences (either supporting or confronting) for the effects of higher education privatisation and instruments of postpritivisation control devices in other developing countries. Accordingly, the generality or specialty of Indian experiences can be empirically established.
NOTES
1. In general, privatisation refers to "transfer of a function, activity, or organisation from the public to the private sector" (Cajucom, 2003) . Or "privatisation is the transfer of activities, assets and responsibilities from government/public institutions and organizations to private individuals and agencies" (Belfield & Levin, 2002, p. 19) .
2. Other important aspects covered in the book include the policy objectives of privatisation, empirical evidence on effects of privatisation, and privatisation methods. The objectives of privatisation include fiscal objectives (e.g., reduction in deficit and debt), attraction of investment, improvement of corporate efficiency and performance, introduction of competition, and promotion of capital markets. The empirical evidence on the effects of privatisation is focused on improvements in corporate efficiency and performance, development of capital markets, reduction in government deficits and debt, and on employment and labour conditions (i.e., working conditions and terms of labour). The most important methods of privatisation include public offerings, trade sales, mixed sales and management, and employee buyouts.
3. Agenda for higher educational reforms in Karnataka is elaborated in Government of Karnataka (2002) .
4. It might be added here that privatisation issues in the Indian economy in general, and in the education sector in particular, have become prominent with the start of structural adjustment programmes (SAP) under the national-and state-level economic reforms in July 1991. That is marketisation (i.e., changing the structure of incentives and institutions such that reliance on market is increased or the role of state is reduced) and privatisation (i.e., shifting resources from government sector to private sector activities) through liberalisation measures. Overall, the major objectives of the reforms include rapid growth of income and productive employment, increased consumers' gains from choice, and exposing producers to competition, both domestically and internationally. For an excellent introduction to India's economic reforms, see, for instance, Joshi (1998) .
5. It might be added here that the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (1990) has brought out a detailed analysis of changes in public and private financing and control of higher education in their member countries, but privatisation of higher education is nowhere referred to and, hence, no reference is made to postprivatisation devices.
6. Hence, universities in distance education (e.g., Karnataka State Open University), special universities for promotion of language and culture (e.g., Humpi Kannada University), deemed universities (e.g., National Institutes of Mental Health and Neuro-Sciences and Manipal Academy of Higher Education) and institutes of higher learning and research (e.g., Indian Institute of Science and Indian Institute of Management) are excluded from the scope of this article.
7. Courses offered in general degree colleges are many and diversified, as elaborated in Narayana (2002a) . For instance, the undergraduate courses include traditional courses (i.e., bachelor of arts, bachelor of science, and bachelor of commerce) and professional courses (e.g., bachelor of computer applications and bachelor of business management). The professional courses include vocational subjects (e.g., industrial chemistry, industrial microbiology, foreign trade and practice, and functional English/communicative English). The postgraduate courses include traditional courses (e.g., master of arts, master of science, and master of commerce) and professional and management courses (e.g., master of business administration and master of computer applications).
8. Alternative ways of classifying the private sector in higher education are evident, for instance, in Tilak (1991) and Williams (1996) . Tilak classifies privatisation into four categories: (a) extreme privatisation (total or pure private institutions), (b) strong privatisation (full cost recovery), (c) moderate privatisation (partial cost recovery), and (d) pseudoprivatisation (government-aided private sector). Williams provides six versions of privatisation: (a) universities run as completely commercial organisations, (b) universities as non-profit making trusts, publicly owned universities receiving a significant part of their income from (c) student fees and (d) from other private sources through consultancy work and letting out other facilities for public sector use, (e) publicly owned universities or universities with trust status contracting out the provision of subsid-iary services to private agencies, and (f) publicly owned and financed universities receiving and allocating their resources on the basis of market criteria.
9. Tilak (1999, p. 120) points out three forms of privatisation of higher education in India. First, privatisation of the system through an increased number of private institutions and a stagnant number and declining proportion of public institutions. Second, actual privatisation of existing public sector institutions of higher learning through transfer of management from government to private trusts. Third, privatisation of the institutions through increased private financing, more fashionably referred to as cost recovery. These forms of privatisation at the national level coincide with the above dimensions of privatisation.
10. This aspect of privatisation is relevant in international context. For instance, Tooley (2001) argues that interest in the private education sector-in developed as well as developing countries-is motivated by . . . the need to restrain public expenditure, in order to reduce budget deficits and external debts, and the consequent need to find alternative sources of funds for education. (p. 30) 11. Another important attempt to introduce privatisation in higher education is a proposal to establish private universities in the state, based on the Private Universities (Establishment and Regulation) Bill, 1995. The bill is detailed in http://interboardap.nic.in/htmlweb/pvt_uni-bill.htm. As this article is focused on privatisation in collegiate education, privatisation of university education is not elaborated.
12. It might be added that in addition to state government grants, the eligible colleges (e.g., permanently affiliated colleges) are provided with development grants by the Government of India through the University Grants Commission. In general, these grants are for capital expenditure purposes, including construction of buildings, purchase of equipment, and books and journals for library. At present, 332 colleges are recipients of the Commission's grants.
13. Aided colleges need not have only aided courses. In fact, many of the aided colleges do have many unaided courses (e.g., professional courses such as bachelor of business management) and subjects (e.g., electronics), as they are not eligible for grants in aid (GIA). This implies that development of unaided courses in private aided colleges is contributory for growth of pure private sector education.
14. A detailed description of GIA policy and codes is given in Narayana (1999) .
15. For instance, the Approach Paper to Subsidies in Karnataka (Government of Karnataka, 1997) recognises that there exists a relationship between budgetary expenditure on and subsidies to different levels of general education in the state in the following terms:
The Higher Education involved considerable subsidisation by Government in our country. This is not justified because the benefits accrued to an insignificant proportion of the population irrespective of whether the beneficiaries have the capacity to pay for the services or not. It is therefore 19. Narayana (2002b) offers evidence on the impact of student loans on reducing budgetary subsidies to collegiate education in the state. He finds that the maximum fee collectable from a student as a percentage of estimated subsidy per student in government (or private aided) colleges is only 4.85% (or 2.83). The evidence clearly implied that fee collections effected so far have not contributed to a sizable share of total subsidy to collegiate education in the state. Alternatively, if the budgetary subsidy is to be entirely financed by student fees, the amount of fee revision should have been gigantic. Consequently, student fee revision as a single instrument may not be an appropriate instrument for total reduction of the budgetary subsidy to collegiate general education in the state.
20. However, empirical evidence on the impact of reduction in GIA on student performance in private aided colleges is mixed, as is evident in Narayana (2000 Narayana ( , 2001c .
21. Quality of collegiate education may be related to three interrelated agents within the colleges: first, quality of students admitted or enrolled in courses; second, quality of working teaching and nonteaching staff; third, quality of physical infrastructure for teaching and learning processes.
22. A copy of these judgements is available from http://www.juris.nic.in/sc/ qrpdisp.asp.
23. Postprivatisation control devices for the education sector are not specific for India. In fact, their relevance is evident in the education sector of other developed and developing countries, such as New Zealand in Woodfield and Gunby (2003) and for People's Republic of China in Yuan (2003) . Woodfield and Gunby focus on the postmarketisation experiences and public control devices in school education:
Proposals for market-based school reforms seek to expand household choices of where children should be schooled. . . . From 1991, however, pupils were permitted to enrol in the school of their choice but were no longer guaranteed a place in their local school. Schools had to accept all applicants unless operating at capacity. Enrolment schemes emerged, with capacity-constrained schools having rights of choice among applicants. Although the marketization of education involved significant changes, central authorities continued to retain a major role in determining teacher employment contracts, approving school charters, and maintaining educational standards. Capital works continued to be the province of the Ministry of Education (MoE), which also determined the national curriculum and significant changes therein which accompanied the government reforms. (pp. 863-864) On the other hand, Yuan notes the postprivatisation control and promotional roles of the government in terms of balance between government control and institutional autonomy. These roles include (a) approval of the establishment of the private institution; (b) favourable financial policies, such as specific encouraging funds; renting or selling land, public assets; favourable taxation policy; encouragement of donations; loans from government banks; and permission of reasonable economic returns of educational investments; (c) assessment of educational quality and accreditation of programs and degrees; and (d) strengthening the governance and management of private institutions including coordination between private sector and governmental agencies.
